UIC Law Review
Volume 12

Issue 3

Article 4

Spring 1979

Overtime Provisions of the FLSA: Expected Liabiliy and Windfall
Recovery, 12 J. Marshall J. Prac. & Proc. 581 (1979)
Marshall K. Brown

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Marshall K. Brown, Overtime Provisions of the FLSA: Expected Liabiliy and Windfall Recovery, 12 J.
Marshall J. Prac. & Proc. 581 (1979)

https://repository.law.uic.edu/lawreview/vol12/iss3/4
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by UIC Law Open Access Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in UIC Law Review by an authorized administrator of UIC Law Open Access Repository. For
more information, please contact repository@jmls.edu.

OVERTIME PROVISIONS OF THE FLSA:
UNEXPECTED LIABILITY AND
WINDFALL RECOVERY
INTRODUCTION

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 19381 (FLSA) has been described as the first modern anti-poverty legislation. 2 The 1938
Act contained minimum wage, 3 maximum hour,4 and child labor
provisions.5 The Act's statutory purpose was expressly set out
in section 2:
The Congress hereby finds ... the existence, in industries engaged
in commerce . . . of labor conditions detrimental to the mainte-

nance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers....
It is hereby declared to be the policy of this Act, through the
exercise by Congress of its power to regulate commerce among the
several states ...

to correct and as rapidly as practicable to elimi-

nate the conditions above referred to .... 6
In United States v. Darby,7 the Supreme Court sustained the
constitutionality of the FLSA as a valid exercise of the commerce power.8 Yet, notwithstanding a generally favorable inter1.- Pub. L. No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 to
219 (1970). The FLSA has been amended by the Fair Labor Standards
Amendments of 1949, Pub. L. No. 81-393, 63 Stat. 910; Fair Labor Standards
Amendments of 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-30, 75 Stat. 65; Equal Pay Act of 1963,
Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56; Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966,
Pub. L. No. 89-601, 80 Stat. 830; Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55; Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-151, 91 Stat. 1245.
2. Willis, The Evolution of the FairLabor StandardsAct, 26 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 607 (1972) (hereinafter cited as Willis).
3. § 6. The substantive provisions of the Equal Pay Act are now also
included in this section.
4. §7.
5. § 12. Though the enforcement and exemption provisions of sections
13-17 apply to all of the substantive sections above, each also contains separate exemptions from that section only.
6. §2.
7. 312 U.S. 100 (1940).
8. Id. at 115-23. Wage-hour legislation had been held unconstitutional
on Due Process grounds. Adkins v. Childrens' Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923);
Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936). But the validity
of such state legislation was assured by West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300
U.S. 379 (1937) (explicitly overruling Adkins). Federal laws which regulated intrastate production activities such as child labor were unconstitutional under Hammer v. Dagenhart (Child Labor Cases), 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
Darby overruled the Child Labor Cases and held that Congress may follow
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pretation by courts and the express Congressional intention to
effect the statutory purpose "as rapidly as practicable," forty
years after passage of the FLSA, the Labor Department still regularly reports record violations of the Act.9

Clearly, the 1938 Act could never be regarded solely as "antipoverty" legislation. The original FLSA exempted any of the nation's lowest-paid workers. 10 Further, section 7's overtime provision prohibited employment in excess of a specified maximum
number of hours at a rate less than one-and-a-half times an employee's "regular rate."" In Overnight Motor TransportationCo.
v. Missel,12 the Supreme Court held that the liability created by
section 7 was separate from the minimum,wage provision of section 6. An employer could not satisfy his statutory obligation
merely by paying an overtime wage more than one-and-a-half
times the minimum wage. 13 Thus even the highest paid workers
were potential beneficiaries of the Act. Additionally, Supreme
Court decisions during the 1940's14 interpreted the overtime pro-

visions so broadly that they created for employers an immense
amount of "wholly unexpected liabilities" and led to the Portalto-Portal Act of 1947.15
The Portal-to-Portal Act provided specific defenses to FLSA
liability. However, these defenses have been narrowly interpreted.' 6 The Court decisions of the 1940's which precluded
waiver, release, compromise and settlement, accord and satisfaction, as defenses to FLSA liability still stand. 17 High Court
decisions involving the FLSA, as well as the legal literature sur"its own conception of public policy ... even though the state has not
sought to regulate . . . ." 312 U.S. at 114.
9. Chicago Sun Times, August 30, 1978, at 2, col. 1; [19771

LABOR RLA-

TlONS YEARBOOK 424; United States Department of Labor Sixty-Fourth Annual Report, 27-30 (1976).
10. The 1938 Act only covered workers actually "engaged in commerce

or in the production of goods for commerce," § 7(a) (1). Congress, in the
1974 Amendments curtailed the exemptions for agricultural workers and
added the finding that "the employment of persons in domestic service in
households affects commerce." 29 U.S.C. § 202(a) (1976).
11. § 7(a) (1). "Regular rate" is not defined in the FLSA, see notes 50-54

and accompanying text infra.
12. 316 U.S. 572 (1942).
13. Id. at 578.

14. See notes 45-80 and accompanying text infra.
15. Pub. L. No. 80-49, 61 Stat. 84 (1947) (now codified as 29 U.S.C. §§ 25162 (1976).
16. See notes 120-38 and accompanying text infra for examples of how

the defenses of the Portal-to-Portal Act has been narrowed by judicial interpretation.
17. See, e.g., Brennan v. Sinor, 391 F. Supp. 681, 684 (N.D. Okla. 1974)
citing Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945).
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rounding the Act, 18 appear to have concentrated on its expanded
coverage rather than possible defenses to liability.' 9
Once coverage is determined, an employer's liability under
the Act is almost absolute. 20 Courts usually find that this strict
liability is necessary to effectuate the statutory purpose of the
FLSA. 21 With expanded coverage, the Act may again represent
unexpected liability to employers in significant proportions.
DEVELOPMENT OF FLSA LrrIGATIbN

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 was passed in response to a Presidential message calling for "[a] day's pay for a
fair day's work. '22 It originally provided for a minimum wage of
twenty-five cents per hour with a forty-four hour work week.
Gradually, wages were to be raised to forty cents an hour and
the work week shortened to forty hours. 23 In construing the
FLSA, the Supreme Court recognized that it was passed in "a
period of widespread unemployment and small profits.124 But
despite the fluctuating economic conditions of the last forty
years, and the many amendments to the Act,25 the basic enforcement structure of the FLSA, including its authoritative construc26
tion, remains essentially the same.
18. E.g., Willis, supra note 2.
19. Four of five articles listed after 29 U.S.C.S. § 207 (Supp. 1978), at 20,
deal with coverage of agricultural workers. The fifth deals with the coverage of state and municipal employees, Kliberg, NationalLeague of Cities v.
Usery: Its Meaning and Impact, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 613 (1977). Also, the
Equal Pay Act has become a much discussed topic, but usually in connection with other civil rights legislation; e.g., Lopatka, A 1977 Primer on the
FederalRegulation of Employment Discrimination,[1977] U. II. L. F. 69.
However, Willis, supra note 2, at 609 n.13, claims that "[t]here have been
surprisingly few articles written on the coverage problems of the FLSA."
(citing three articles).
20. All a covered employee need prove is that he worked over forty
hours in a single work week to shift the burden of proof to the employer,
Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 686-87 (1946) discussed at
notes 148-51 and accompanying text infra.
21. See Brooklyn Say. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 707 (1945) and notes
65-74 and accompanying text infra.
22. 81 CONG. REC. 498 (message of President Roosevelt of May 24, 1937).
23. §§ 6-7. The 1977 Amendments, § 2(a) raises the minimum wage to
$3.15 an hour effective January 1, 1981.
24. Overnight Motor Say. Co. v. Missel, 316 U.S. at 578.
25. Though unemployment was at a low national rate of only 3.8% in
1966, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF
THE UNITED STATES, at 216 (93rd ed. 1972), the Congress still instructed the
Secretary of Labor to report on the number of jobs lost to the economy by
the use of overtime work, 1966 Amendments, § 603. See note 212 infra.
26. The provisions of the Portal-to-Portal Act are interpreted so that
they do not modify the basic structure of the FLSA itself, Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 253 (1956).
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Enforcement Provisionsof the FLSA

A Wage and Hour Division within the Department of Labor
was created to administer the FLSA.27 The Act imposes on employers the duty to keep prescribed records appropriate to enforcement and it authorizes the Secretary of Labor, or his
designated representative2 8 to inspect all such records and
29
make other necessary investigations.
Section 15 makes certain conduct unlawful. An employer
cannot violate the substantive provisions of sections 6 and 7 by
30
It
paying his employees less than the required compensation.
3l
is unlawful for any person
to ship goods in interstate commerce, or to sell with knowledge such goods, which have been
produced in violation of the Act.3 2 An employer cannot discharge or otherwise retaliate against an employee who makes a
33
Furcomplaint or participates in a proceeding under the Act.
ther, it is unlawful for an employer to fail to keep the required
records, or to maintain false records, or to violate any other or34
der or regulation made under the Act.
To prevent these prohibited activities, the FLSA contemplates both public and private enforcement. Any willful violation of the conduct made unlawful is a criminal offense and
punishable by imprisonment for a second conviction.35 The Secretary is authorized to supervise the payment of back wages due
under the Act 36 and he may now bring suit on behalf of employees to recover such wages. 3 7 When necessary, the Secretary
27. § 4. Rule making authority is granted by § 11(d) as amended by the
1949 Amendments, § 9.
28. The Secretary replaced the Wage-Hour Administrator as the official
named in the Act through Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1950, 64 Stat. 1263:
[T] here are hereby transferred to the Secretary of Labor all functions
of all other officers of the Department of Labor .... The Secretary...
may from time to time make such provisions as he shall deem appropriate authorizing the performance by any other officer ... of the Department of Labor of any function of the Secretary....
29. § 11(a).
30. § 15(a)(2).
31. All the section's prohibitions apply to any "person" though the substantive duty imposed by § 7(a) applies only to an employer.
32. § 15(a) (1). This provision, validated in Darby, was similar to the
legislation struck down in the Child Labor Cases. See note 8 supra.
33. § 15(a) (3). Section 10 of the 1977 Amendments provides that the
term employee includes a former employee.
34. § 15(a)(5).
35. § 16(a).
36. § 16(c). The statute additionally provides that any recovered sums
not claimed by the employees are to be paid into the Treasury of the United
States.
37. The 1974 Amendments deleted the prior requirements that 16(c)
suits be brought only on an employee's written request and where the case
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may bring suit for an injunction in a United States District Court
38
to restrain violations of the FLSA.
Even so comprehensive a scheme of public enforcement is
inadequate to reach the millions of employer-employee relationships covered by the Act. Both to redress wrongs under the
FLSA and to aid in enforcement, 39 section 16(b) provides for a
private cause of action:
Any employer who violates the provisions of section 6 or section 7
of this Act shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in
the amount of their unpaid.., compensation,.., and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.... The court in such
action shall, in addition to any judgnTent awarded to the plaintiff,
allow a reasonable 4attorney's
fee to be paid by the defendant, and
°
costs of the action.
The 1938 Act was silent on whether or not an employee
might maintain a private action because of employer retaliation 41 and the courts which passed on the question were in conflict.4 2

In the 1977 Amendments, Congress expressly provided

for such an action.43 Whatever faults may be found in a system
of private enforcement, Congress has now reaffirmed its intention to encourage employee suits and the policy long recognized
in judging such actions:
[T]he liability of an employer is something more than a debt or
liability to an individual.
...An employee, exercising his rights under Section 16(b) of the
Act exercises them, not only for his own benefit, but the benefit of
did not involve an unsettled issue of law; and allowed for the recovery of
liquidated damages in addition to back pay.
38. § 17. Issuance of the injunction is discretionary with the District
Court, not mandatory on the mere finding of a violation, and should be
granted in accordance with the public policy of the FLSA, Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy, & Assoc., 358 U.S. 207 (1959). A court may refuse an injunction when it finds no question of future compliance by the employer,
Hodgson v. American Can Co., 440 F.2d 916 (8th Cir. 1971), but may enjoin a
defendant as a corporation even where violations have been found at only
some of its sixty chain stores, Brennan v. J. M. Fields, Inc., 488 F.2d 443 (5th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1974) (an equal pay case).
39. See quotation accompanying note 72 infra.
40. § 16(b). This right of the employee is terminated if the Secretary
brings a Section 17 injunction suit, 1961 Amendments, § 12.
41. This is an act prohibited by § 15(a)(3).
42. Compare Powell v. Washington Post Co., 267 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 360 U.S. 930 (1959) and Martinez v. Behring's Bearings Serv.,
Inc., 501 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1974) (Congress would have explicitly provided
such an action if it wanted one) with Boll v. Federal Reserve Bank of St.
Louis, 365 F. Supp. 637 (E.D. Mo. 1973), affirmed, 497 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1974)
and Fagot v. Flintkote, 305 F. Supp. 407 (E.D. La. 1969) (Congress intended a
scheme of both private and public enforcement). Where the Secretary
brings an injunction suit (rather than a 16(a) criminal action), the court
may order damages paid to employees for wrongful discharge as incidental
relief, Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960).

43. § 10.
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the general public. Consequently, public policy demands that such
exercise be not unnecessarily hampered.
Supreme Court Construction of the FLSA
In construing the overtime provisions of the 1938 Act, the
Supreme Court expanded on the express purpose of the
FLSA.45 In one case, the Court stated "the Congressional purpose in enacting section 7(a) was twofold: (1) to spread employment by placing financial pressure on the employer through the
overtime requirement... ; and (2) to compensate employees for
the burden of a workweek in excess of the hours fixed in the
Act."46
In Darbythe Supreme Court held that Congress could legislate against labor conditions it found detrimental to workers and
therefore a burden on commerce. 47 In Missel, the Court found
that since the overtime requirement was intended to spread employment, it could be constitutionally applied absent any showing that the excess hours were injurious to workers. 48 The
language of the FLSA was "clear and unambiguous. It calls for
150% of the regular rate, not the minimum wage. '49 The "regular rate" for a particular week would be determined by dividing
50
weekly earnings by the hours worked each week.
Where employees were paid fixed salaries for fluctuating
work weeks, the Court found it difficult "to provide a rigid defini51
tion of 'regular rate' when Congress has failed to provide one."
It once held that employers could stipulate a regular rate by
contract and then pay a fixed weekly salary regardless of hours
worked as long as the compensation "equals or exceeds the minimum required by the Act."'5 2 But later decisions obliviated this
44. Plourde v. Massachusetts Cities Realty Co., 47 F. Supp. 668, 670-71
(D. Mass. 1942).
45. See text accompanying note 6 supra and the explanation of Congressional purpose in Interpretive Bulletin on the General Coverage of the
Wage and Hour Provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act in 29 C.F.R.
§ 776.1 (1977).
46. Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, 323 U.S. 37, 40 (1944). Though the
purpose of spreading employment is not specifically mentioned in the Act,
courts have consistently recognized it equally with the express purposes in
overtime cases; e.g., Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U.S. 446, 460
(1946); Brennan v. Lauderdale Yacht Basin, 493 F.2d 188, 189 (5th Cir. 1974).
47. 312 U.S. at 115-23.
48. 316 U.S. at 576-77. "Long hours may impede the free interstate flow
of commodities.... If in the judgment of Congress, time and a half for
overtime has a substantial effect on these conditions it lies within Congress'
power to use it to promote the employees' well-being." Id. at 577.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 580 n.16.
51. Walling v. A.H. Belo Corp., 316 U.S. 624, 634 (1942).
52. Id. at 630. The Court accepted the finding "that the contracts were
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holding5 3 by making the regular rate a matter of judicial deter54
mination of fact in each particular case.
There was also uncertainty as to what constitutes working
time. The FLSA defines "employ" as including "to suffer or permit to work. '55 "Of course an employer, if he chooses, may hire
a man to do nothing, or to do nothing but wait for something to
happen. '56 In Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,57 the Court held that
whether waiting time was working time was a matter for retrospective judicial determination based on the facts of the particular case, 58 and while they are to be given great deference, the
policies of the Administrator are not conclusive. 59 The Court
has declared that in either an employee's private action or a proceeding by the Secretary of Labor, "good administration of the
Act and good judicial administration alike require that the standards of public enforcement and those for determining private
rights shall be at variance only where justified by very good rea60
sons."
In Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local No. 6169, UMWA, 61 the
Court found that time spent by minors in traveling from the portal of the mines to their usual places of work was compensable
under the FLSA.62 The majority in Jewell Ridge made this finding in disregard of the Administrator's interpretations, a valid
collective bargaining agreement, and the acknowledged custom
'actual bona fide contracts of employment' and that 'they intended to, and
did, really fix the regular rates at which each employee was employed'." Id.
at 629-30.
53. Walling v. Helmerich & Payne, 323 U.S. 37, 39-42 (1944) (plan which
kept pre-FLSA wages was invalid); Walling v. Youngerman-Reynolds Hardwood Co., 325 U.S. 419, 424 (1945) (can't evade FLSA through hypothetical
piecework rates); 145 Madison Ave. Corp. v. Asselta, 331 U.S. 199, 206-09
(1947) (stipulated weekly guarantee for 46 hour week does not include required overtime pay).
54. Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron, 334 U.S. 446, 461-63 (1948). "[TIhe
Belo decision ... does not imply that mere words in a contract can fix the
regular rate." Id. at 462.
55. § 3(g).
56. Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 133 (1944) (privately employed firemen must be paid for their waiting time).
57. 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
58. Id. at 136.
59. Id. at 139.
60. Id. at 140.
61. 325 U.S. 161 (1945).
62. Id. at 167, "Congress intended... to achieve a uniform national policy of guaranteeing compensation for all work. . . ." (emphasis added).
The Jewell Ridge Court liberally applied the three element test it developed in Tennessee Coal, Iron & Ry. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S.
590, 598-99 (1944): 1) Physical and mental exertion whether burdensome or
not, 2) Exertion controlled or required by the employer, 3) Exertion pursued primarily or necessarily for the beniflt of the employer. 325 U.S. at 16366.
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of the industry.

63

Uncertainty over working time, regular rate, as well as coverage" had led some employers to try to reach agreement with
their employees and avoid the claim for liquidated damages
under the Act. But, in Brooklyn Savings Bank v. OWei165 the
Court held that any waiver or release of either the unpaid com-

pensation or the liquidated damages would be ineffective. "No
one can doubt but that to allow waiver of statutory wages by
'66
agreement would nullify the purposes of the Act.
Moreover, the same policy which forbids employee waiver of the
minimum statutory rate because of inequality of bargaining power,
prohibits these same employees from bargaining with their employer in determining that so little damage
was suffered that
67
waiver of liquidated damages is called for.
The plaintiff in ONeil had been offered the full amount of back
wages by his employer who had heard of another case indicating
that he was covered by the FLSA. 68 The Court held that bringing suit was not a precondition to receiving the liquidated dam69
ages.
Even where employees had accepted payment in settlement
of a bona fide dispute over coverage, the majority in D.A. Schulte
v. Gangi70 held that accord and satisfaction was unenforceable. 7 1 The Court showed little sympathy for the plight of em63. The danger to collective bargaining is the basis of a vigorous dissent
doubting whether there was another case where the "Court has made a
more extreme exertion of power or one so little supported or explained by
either the statute or the record. . . ." Id. at 196 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
64. In A.B. Kirschbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942), the Court
found that maintenance employees of a particular building with tenants engaged in commerce had a sufficient connection with interstate commerce to
be covered themselves by the FLSA. Justice Frankfurter characteristically
refused to draw a "mathematical line" which would provide a rigid definition of how "necessary" an employee must be to be engaged in commerce.
Id. at 526.
65. 324 U.S. 697 (1945).
66. Id. at 707.
67. Id. at 708.
68. Id. at 703. The question of coverage was similar to Kirschbaum discussed at note 64 supra. Upon learning of that decision, the defendant-employer in O'Neil tendered to his employees checks for the wages due if they
were covered.
69. Id. at 711: "Section 16(b) ... provides absolutely that the employer
shall be liable for liquidated damages...." (emphasis added).
70. 328 U.S. 108 (1946).
71. Id. at 110. Unlike O'Neil, the defendant refused to make any payments at all until after suit was filed. The trial court found that there had
been an effective accord and satisfaction of a bona fide dispute, 53 F. Supp.
844, 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). Had it been material to the outcome, the bona fideness of the dispute might have been questioned. The Court took judicial
notice that the defendant's loft building was renting to tenants in the obviously interstate New York garment industry, 328 U.S. at 120.
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ployers:
In a bona fide adjustment on coverage, there are the same threats
to the public purposes of the Wage-Hour Act that exist when the
liquidated damages are waived. The damages are at the same time
compensatory and an aid to enforcement. It is quite true that the
liquidated damage provision acts harshly upon employers whose
violations are not deliberate but arise from uncertainties or mistakes as to coverage. Since the possibility of violations inheres in
every instance of employment that is covered by the Act, Congress
evidently felt it should not provide for variable compensation to fit
the degree of blame in each infraction. Instead Congress adopted a
mandatory requirement that the employer pay a sum in liquidated
damages equal to the unpaid wages so as to compensate the injured employee for the retention of his pay.
It is realized that this conclusion puts the employer and his
employees to an 'all or nothing gamble,' ... 72
The Court's conclusion that neither unpaid compensation nor
liquidated damages "are capable of reduction by compromise of
controversies over coverage'- 3 leaves open the possibility of an
effective compromise of a bona fide dispute over factual matters
74
such as the number of hours worked.
In Bay Ridge Operating Co. v. Aaron 75 a few dissident
union members 76 brought an action for overtime compensation
allegedly earned under a contract providing premium pay designated as overtime. The Court recognized that the United States
was the real party in interest, since the work done was under
costs-plus wartime contracts under which the government was
liable for the wages. 77 The majority showed as little sympathy
for the taxpayers in this case, as it had for other employers. 7 8
The Court held that the premiums were mere "shift differentials" with excess compensation now due "of course subject to
enlargement under the provisions of section 16(b). '79 Even the
passage of the Portal-to-Portal Act did not deter the Court from
finding that its holding was mandated by the intention of Con72. Id. at 115-16 (footnotes omitted).
73. Id. at 116 (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 114. The Court expressly declined to rule on this question.
75. 334 U.S. 446 (1948).
76. Id. at 454. The International Longshoremen's Association filed a
brief opposing the employee's suit.
77. Id. at 453. The defendant employers were represented by the U.S.
Justice Department throughout the litigation.
78. Industry representatives had testified that the potential liability to
all employees was $260,000,000. This estimate did not allow for the retroactive effect of the Portal-to-Portal Act which had been enacted while the suit
was pending. Id. at 454 n.7.
79. Id. at 460. The Court did hold that the "shift differentials" need not
be included in determining time-and-a-half for those hours since overtime
on overtime was not in the contemplation of Congress in enacting the
FLSA. Id. at 464.
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gress to spread employment through the overtime provisions of
the 1938 Act.8 0
The Portal-to-PortalAct of 1947
The 1947 Act begins with the Congressional finding "that the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended, has been judicially interpreted in disregard of long-established customs, practices, and contracts between employers and employees, thereby
creating wholly unexpected liabilities, immense in amount and
81 The Act then lists ten ways in
retroactive in operation ......
which business, labor, and government faced economic disaster
82
should the FLSA be enforced as its case law had developed.
Congress declared that it was acting "to meet the existing emer83
gency and to correct existing evils.
The Portal-to-Portal Act's provisions give employers both
retroactive8 4 and prospective relief8 5 for claims arising because
of certain preliminary and postliminary activities which might
otherwise be considered working time. 86 The 1947 Act also permitted employee waiver of liquidated damages for claims arising
87
before its passage.
The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 contained no statute
80. Id. at 460. The case was remanded for judgment in accordance with
the 1947 Act. Id. at 477.
81. § 1(a).
82. One of the dangers in the Congressional findings is "[E]mployees
would receive windfall payments, including liquidated damages, of sums for
activities performed by them without an expectation of reward beyond that
included in their agreed rates of pay." § l(a) (4). Compare the above with
the Court's previous characterization of the liquidated damages and
mandatory overtime payments. See notes 48, 69, and 72 and accompanying
text supra. If the Congressional purpose in enacting the FLSA was to impose its judgment on the bargaining process, why should the workers' expectations matter? Did Congress intend to change the policy of the FLSA,
or was it merely exaggerating the situation to aid in sustaining the Portalto-Portal Act against the expected constitutional challenge? See notes 96-98
and accompanying text infra.
83. § 1(b) (emphasis added).
84. § 2 entitled "Existing Claims."
85. § 4 entitled "Future Claims."
86. For existing claims, liability was excused for activities not compensable by contract or custom. For future claims, the only such activities
would be:
(1) walking, riding, or traveling to and from the actual place of performance of the principal activity or activities which such employee is
employed to perform, and
(2) activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to said principal activity or activities ....
§ 4(a). "Principal activity" is not defined in the Act.
87. § 3(b). Any settlement must be free of fraud or duress, § 3(c). This
proposition hardly requires codification, but the statute might serve to shift
the burden of proof to the proponent of the settlement.
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of limitations. Courts had been applying the closest state periods 88 with some states deliberately enacting short periods 89
while in others, longer contract periods were liberally applied. 90
To eliminate this practice, the Portal-to-Portal Act provided for a
uniform two-year period for all causes of action under the
FLSA.9 1 The 1966 Amendments extended the statutory period
92
to three years in the case of a "willful violation."
The 1947 Act established "good faith" defenses to liability or
liquidated damages. For claims arising before enactment, an
employer was relieved of liability if he could show that he acted
in good faith and in reliance on any ruling, interpretation, or enforcement policy of any United States agency. 93 For later
claims, this defense is available only to an employer who can
plead and prove both that he acted "in conformity with and in
reliance on any written administrative" ruling or interpretation
from the administrator specified in the Act.94 No attempt was
made to alter the Supreme Court decisions which had precluded
95
other defenses.
Finally, to assuage the harshness of the mandatory double
damages of section 16(b), the Portal-to-Portal Act provided that:
(I]f the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that the act
or omission giving rise to such action was in good faith and that he
had reasonable grounds for believing that his act or omission was
not a violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended,
the court may in its sound discretion, award no liquidated damages
or award any amount thereof not to exceed the amount specified in
88. Caldwell v. Alabama Dry Dock &Shipbldg. Co., 161 F.2d 83 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 332 U.S. 759 (1947).
89. Smith v. Cudahy Packing Co., 73 F. Supp. 41 (D. Minn. 1947) upheld
a Minnesota statute providing a two-year limitation period for back wage

claims based on labor legislation, but keeping a six-year period for wage

claims based on contracts. But cf.Republic Pictures Corp. v. Kappler, 151
F.2d 543 (8th Cir. 1945), affirmedper curiam, 327 U.S. 757 (1946) which invalidated on Equal Protection grounds an Iowa statute passed by a legislature
hostile to the Act which provided a short limitation period aimed solely at
the FLSA.
90. See Bright v. Hobbs, 56 F. Supp. 723 (D. Md. 1944) which applied
Maryland's 12 year statute for an action on a specialty. But see Roland Elec.
Co. v. Black, 163 F.2d 417 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 854 (1947) which
held that Maryland's three year limitation period for contracts of employment should be applied to FLSA actions in that state.
91. § 6(a).
92. 1966 Amendments, § 601.
93. §9.

94. § 10(a) (emphasis added). The stricter provisions which apply to fu-

ture claims continue the pattern of Parts I1and III, notes 84-87 supra. Congress originally intended to apply Section 9 to all claims-both existing and
future, H.R. REP. No. 98, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., reprintedin [1947] U.S. CODE

1031, 1036.
95. See notes 45-80 and accompanying text supra.
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96
section 16 of such Act.
The preamble to the 1947 Act forebodes economic consequences
more disastrous than those of the depression atmosphere of the
1938 Act.9 7 Probably, Congress thought it was necessary to

stress the effect on commerce to assure the constitutionality of
the retroactive aspects of the 1947 legislation. However, the Act
was upheld by the lower courts without the necessity of
Supreme Court review.9 8 Subsequently, constitutional challenges by private FLSA defendants have been wholly unsuccessful. 99
DEFENDING AGAINST OVERTIME

LIABILITY

The dual nature of the Portal-to-Portal Act-some provi00
sions retrospective only and some prospective' -permitted
two alternate courses of development for FLSA litigtion. Courts
could have interpreted the Act so as to preclude the recurrence
of the "emergency" type situation which inspired its passagethe creation of an "immense amount" of "unexpected" liability.1 1 But, the Court found that "[t] he Portal-to-Portal Act was
designed primarily to meet an 'existing emergency' resulting
would have created 'wholly
from claims which, if allowed ...
96. § 11 (emphasis added).
97. § 1(a). See notes 81-82 supra and legislative history in [1947] U.S.
CODE CONG. SERV. 1031.
98. Adkins v. E. I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 176 F.2d 661 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 895 (1949); Fisch v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 299
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 902 (1948); Darr v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of
N.Y., 169 F.2d 262 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 871 (1948); Atallah v. B.H.
Hubert & Son, 168 F.2d 993 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 868 (1948). The
constitutional issue might be more difficult in the wake of Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970) and its progeny, which have found that there are statutory entitlements protected by Due Process.
99. However, state governments have successfully challenged the applicability to them of the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the FLSA.
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The validity of FLSA
coverage of state schools and hospitals had been upheld in Maryland v.
Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) noted in 19 DRAKE L. REV. 177 (1969). The 1974
Amendments, § 6, extended coverage to almost all state and municipal employees. In Darby the Court had said that the Tenth "[Ajmendment states
but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered," 312 U.S.
at 124. In holding unconstitutional FLSA coverage of employees engaged in
the activities of the state "qua State," the National League of Cities Court
expressly overruled Maryland v. Wirtz, 426 U.S. at 840, and held that the
extension violated the Tenth Amendment's "constitutional policy that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity
or their ability to function effectively in a federal system." 426 U.S. at 842-43.
100. See notes 84-86 and 93-94 and accompanying text supra.
101. "The underlying reason for its enactment was to foreclose a myriad
There is
of suits demanding some six billion dollars as compensation ....
no indication that Congress intended to modify the scope of employment
under the Fair Labor Standards Act." Western Union Tel. Co. v. McComb,
165 F.2d 65 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 862 (1947) (emphasis added).
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unexpected liabilities'.... -102 Courts have interpreted the limited defenses of the 1947 Act quite narrowly, 10 3 rarely departing
from the earlier pattern of imposing strict liability on offending
104
employers.
Statute of Limitations
The principle incentive for the inclusion of the statute of
limitation in the Portal-to-Portal Act was the desire for uniformity and a limitation or retroactive liability.' 0 5 The Act's language provides that an FLSA action not commenced within two
years of accrual "be forever barred."'10 6 Regardless of this conclusive language, courts have permitted the statute to be tolled
in accordance with common law 10 7 and have found an employer
estopped from pleading the statute of limitations as a de102. Steiner v. Mitchell, 350 U.S. 247, 253 (1956) where the Court held time
spent by employees showering and changing clothes after work under an
industrial hygiene program was compensable despite § 4 of the Portal-toPortal Act. Principal activities under that section was still a matter for judicial interpretation. See note 86 supra.
103. E.g., Dunlop v. City Elec. Inc., 527 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1976) which accepted the Administrator's interpretation of principal activity as excluding
only time spent in pursuit of the employee's own benefit.
"Congress intended the words ... to be construed liberally.., to include any work of consequence performed for an employer no matter when
the act is performed." 29 C.F.R. § 790.8 (1977).
104. "In applying the Act to the facts at hand, we must liberally construe
it 'to apply to the furtherest reaches consistent with congressional direction' in fulfillment of its humanitarian and remedial purpose." Brennan v.
Plaza Shoe Store, Inc., 522 F.2d 843, 846 (8th Cir. 1975) citing Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Assoc., 358 U.S. 207, 211 (1959); Marshall v. Elks Club of
Huntington, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 957, 965 (S.D.W. Va. 1977).
105. See H.R. REP. No. 71, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. reprinted in [1947] U.S.
CODE CONG. SERV. 1031, 1035. Courts have therefore inferred that the Congress only intended the statute to be a limitation of the remedy and not on
the right to bring an action. Hodgson v. Humphries, 454 F.2d 1279, 1284 (10th
Cir. 1972).
106. Portal-to-Portal Act, § 6(a) reads:
Any action commenced on or after the date of the enactment of this Act
...under the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 .... may be commenced within two years after the cause of action accrued, and every
such action shall be forever barred unless commenced within two years
after the cause of action accrued.
107. McCloskey v. Dickinson, 56 A.2d 442, 444 (D.C. Mun. App. 1947)
("lulling" by promising to make payments); cf.Bingham v. Advance Indus.
Security Inc., 138 Ga. App. 903, 228 S.E.2d 1, 2 (1976) (maybe promise to pay
or written acknowledgement would toll statute, but not partial payment
alone); Hitzman v. Ethyl Corp. 42 So. 2d, 155, 158 (La. App. 1949) (acknowledgement must be unequivical to toll). But cf.Shunney v. Fuller, 111 F.2d
543 (D.R.I. 1953) (not tolled by employee being abroad or merely asking for
payment). But see Shandelman v. Schuman, 92 F. Supp. 334, 335 (E.D. Pa.

1950) ("statute, in unequivocal, mandatory language, states that recovery
on a cause of action more than two years old 'shall be forever barred"').
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fense.108
Courts hold that the limitation period is procedural rather
than substantive. 0 9 Accordingly, it is waived unless affirmatively pleaded." 0 The cause of action does not accrue until the
payday on which the overtime should have been paid."'
Further, the limitation period is now three years for virtually any violation despite the language limiting the 1966 extension to a "willful violation."'1 2 Courts have found that willful
means only that the violation was not inadvertent. 113 Though in
a civil context, "willful" need not connote the same state of mind
as when the term is used in a criminal statute, 114 on its face the
word imparts something more than mere inadvertance. Nevertheless, a violation can be in "good faith" and still be willful
within the meaning of the statute." 5
The extended period has been held applicable when the em108. Safrin v. Friedman, 27 Misc. 2d 687, 96 N.Y.S.2d 627 (Sup. Ct. 1950),
affirmed, 101 N.Y.S.2d 216 (App. Div. 1951); accord Ott v. Midland-Ross

Corp., 523 F.2d 1367 (6th Cir. 1975) (estopped to plead the same statute
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 621-34).
109. Hodgson v. Humphries, 454 F.2d 1279, 1283-84 (10th Cir. 1972) (limita-

tion not substantive because in separate act and therefore not part of Congressional scheme).
110. Mumbower v. Callicot, 526 F.2d 1183, 1187 n.5 (8th Cir. 1975) (not considered when first raised on appeal, statute of limitations must be affirmatively pleaded under FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c)).
111. The general rule is that overtime compensation earned in a particular workweek must be paid on the regular pay day for the period in which
such workweek ends .... Payment may not be delayed for a period longer

than is reasonably necessary for the employer to compute and arrange for
payment of the amount due and in no event may payment be delayed beyond the next payday after such computation can be made. 29 C.F.R.
§ 778.106 (1977). This regulation was sustained in Brennan v. State of New
Jersey, 364 F. Supp. 156, 159 (1973), discussed at notes 188-92 infra.
112. The 1966 Amendments, § 601, added, "except that a cause of action
arising out of a willful violation may be commenced within three years after
the cause of action accrued."
113. E.g., Hodgson v. Hyatt, 318 F. Supp. 390, 393 (N.D. Fla. 1970)
("[W]illful must be construed in the civil sense," applies to "intentional,
knowing, or voluntary" but "not accidental" conduct, but includes "careless
disregard"). Accord, Brennan v. Heard, 491 F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir. 1974) (not
inadvertant when employer had heard of FLSA amendments); Bailey v. Pilot's Ass'n for Bay and River Delaware, 406 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Pa. 1976);

Dowd v. Blackstone Cleaners Inc., 306 F. Supp. 1276, 1282 (N.D. Tex. 1969)
(employer didn't call lawyer about practice of paying cash on weekends).
See also Shearer v. E. Brame Trucking Co., 69 Mich. App. 443, 245 N.W.2d 84
(1976) (willful doesn't contemplate malice or bad motive).
114. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
115. "Willful is construed to include violations made in good faith if the
employer is aware of the ... Act". Herman v. Roosevelt Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 432 F. Supp. 843, 851 (E.D. Mo. 1977), affirmed, 569 F.2d 1033 (8th Cir.
1978); Usery v. Goodwin Hardware, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 1243, 1267 (W.D. Mich.
1976). But cf.Clark v. Atlanta Newspapers Inc., 366 F. Supp. 886, 897 (N.D.

Ga. 1973) (violation willful because not in good faith).
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ployer "knows or has reason to know" that he is governed by the
Act," 6 or simply when he realizes that "the Act is in the picture"1 1 7 and somewhat inconsistently, even when his lawyer
told him he need not fear the overruling of his wage plan." 8
Further, a mere allegation of willfulness in a complaint will defeat a motion to dismiss the third year's claim pending the evidence taken at trial." 9

Good FaithDefenses
The defense of the Portal-to-Portal Act, which totally excuses an employer's liability when he acts in good faith reliance
on a written administrative ruling, 20 has only been allowed
when it can be unequivocally invoked. 121 Employers cannot rely
on the inaction of the administrator in issuing a ruling 22 or on
the employer's own written memorandum of a conversation
116. Brennan v. J. M. Fields, Inc., 488 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 881 (1974).
117. Conklin v. Joseph C. Hofgesang Sand Co., Inc. 407 F. Supp. 1090, 1094
(W.D. Ky. 1975), remanded on other grounds, 565 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1977).
See also Dunlop v. New Hampshire Jockey Club, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 416, 423
(D.N.H. 1976), reversed on other grounds, 562 F.2d 1373 (1st Cir. 1977).
118. Coleman v. Jiffy June Farms, Inc., 458 F.2d 1139 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.

denied, 409 U.S. 948 (1972):
The entire legislative history of the 1966 amendments of the FLSA indicates a liberalizing intention on the part of Congress. Requiring employers to have more than awareness of the possible applicability of the
FLSA would be inconsistent with that intent. Consequently, we hold
that employer's decision to change his employees' rate of pay in violation of FLSA is 'willful' when, as in this case, there is substantial evidence in the record to support a finding that the employer knew or
suspected that his actions might violate the FLSA. Stated most simply,
we think the test should be: Did the employer know the FLSA was in
the picture?
Id. at 1142. But cf.Marshall v. McAlester Corp., 438 F. Supp. 1005, 1014 (E.D.
Okla. 1977) (no willful violation by employer who kept records required by

FLSA).
119. Bormann v. Long Island Press Publishing Co., Inc., 379 F. Supp. 951
(E.D.N.Y. 1974); Wirtz v. Handy, 279 F. Supp. 264 (S.D. Fla. 1967). See also

Conklin v. Joseph C. Hofgesang Sand Co., Inc., 407 F. Supp. 1090 (W.D.Ky.
1975), remanded on other grounds, 565 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1977) (failure to
plead willful violation does not defeat third year's claim when evidence at
trial showed willfulness; where willfulness not alleged, pleadings may be
conformed to the proof under FED. R.Civ. P. 15).
120. Portal-to-Portal Act, § 10. See note 94 and accompanying text supra.
121. Hodgson v. Square D Co., 459 F.2d 805 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 967 (1972). The language of the Administrator's letter was "we are not
prepared to say that the proposed pay plan would contravene the.
provisions of the FLSA." Id. at 809.
122. Schultz v. Deane-Hill Country Club, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 272 (E.D.
Tenn. 1969), affirmed, 433 F.2d 1311 (6th Cir. 1970) (Interpretive Bulletin
marked as not including latest amendments to FLSA); Retail Store Employee's Union, Local 400 v. Drug Fair Community Drug Co., 307 F. Supp.
473, 480 (D.D.C. 1969) (Administrator refused to act on original complaint).
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with the administrator. 123 Where there are conflicting rulings,
the employer cannot simply choose which to follow; good faith
reliance must be determined on an objective basis. 124 Further,
the reliance must be actual and there is no defense where the
employer did not know of the ruling at the time of the viola125
tion.
The limited defense to liquidated damages 126 is not much
easier to obtain. A Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that liquidated damages should not be awarded absent a showing of "bad
faith, malice, or oppression."'1 27 But the same circuit has more
12 8
recently reversed a District Court which used such a standard
and has adopted the long-held view of other circuits which have
ruled on the question that the employer has the "substantial
burden" of persuading the court that his violation was "both in
good faith and based on such reasonable grounds that it would
be unfair to impose liquidated damages upon him."'1 29 Absent
such a showing the double damages are mandatory, but not
withstanding such a showing the matter is still within the sound
discretion of the trial judge 130 who will be overruled only upon
123. Pilkenton v. Appalachian Regional Hosps., Inc., 336 F. Supp. 334
(W.D.Va. 1971).
124. Clifton D. Mayhew, Inc. v. Wirtz, 413 F.2d 658, 661 (4th Cir. 1969). See
also Hodgson v. Royal Crown Bottling Co., Inc., 465 F.2d 473, 475 (5th Cir.
1972) (no good faith reliance on voluntary dismissal of previous complaint).
125. Martinez v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 283 F. Supp. 514 (D. Idaho 1968),
affirmed, 424 F.2d 547 (9th Cir. 1970) (but defense when successor employer
claimed reliance on letter to predecessor left in company files).
126. Portal-to-Portal Act, § 11, see note 96 and accompanying text supra.
127. Clougherty v. James Vernor Co., 187 F.2d 288, 293 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 814 (1951).
128. McClanahan v. Mathews, 440 F.2d 320, 323 (6th Cir. 1971). The District Court in McClanahan,292 F. Supp. 737 (E.D. Ky. 1968), said that liquidated damages should only be awarded against employers who are
"outrageous" violators, "maliciously and knowingly oppressive." The decision also implicitly overrules Snelling v. OK Service Garage, Inc., 311 F.
Supp. 842 (E.D. Ky. 1970) saying that liquidated damages are only awarded
where the employer "stubbornly refuses" to comply with the FLSA.
129. Rothman v. Publicker Indus., 201 F.2d 618, 620 (3rd Cir. 1953) (emphasis added). Accord, King v. Board of Educ., 435 F.2d 295, 298 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 908 (1970); Wright v. Carrigg, 275 F.2d 448, 449 (4th Cir.
1960).
130. McClanahan v. Mathews, 440 F.2d 320 (6th Cir. 1971). The discretion
not to award the liquidated damages is with the court and not the jury.
Martin v. Detroit Marine Terminals, Inc., 189 F. Supp. 579, 581-83 (E.D. Mich.
1960). Such discretion was sustained against constitutional challenge. 440
F.2d at 322. Though Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974) held that the Seventh Amendment applies equally to common law and statutory actions,
courts still consider the liquidated damages award as a matter for the trial
judge to decide alone. Hannon v. Continental Nat'l Bank, 427 F. Supp. 215,
219-22 (D. Colo. 1977); Shearer v. E. Brame Trucking Co., Inc., 69 Mich. App.
443, 245 N.W.2d 84 (1976).
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"compelling circumstances.'

131

The right to liquidated damages arises at the time the overtime compensation was not paid, 132 and therefore a later good
faith attempt to tender payment will not excuse the liquidated
damages. 133 Interestingly, a court may use a later refusal of the
employer to pay as evidence that the violation was not in good

faith.134
Recent cases have allowed the defense to liquidated damages against small, informally-run family businesses, 135 but not
allowed it for large corporate employers, even where there is no
evidence of any intention to violate the FLSA. 136 The burden is
on the employer to prove an "honest intention to ascertain what
the Act requires and to act in accordance with it.'1 v The policy
of the FLSA requires that liquidated damages be mandatory until it is "conclusively established that the employer had no
means of knowing of its error."'1
Non-Statutory Defenses
The "good faith" defenses of the Portal-to-Portal Act 3 9 have
been called the "exclusive estoppel" to liability under the
FLSA, 14° and courts still rule that to permit waiver or release of
131. Reed v. Murphy, 232 F.2d 668, 678 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831
(1956).
132. See note 111 supra. This is a logical conclusion from the holding
that a demand on the employer is not a precondition to bringing suit.
Brooklyn Say. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. at 711.
133. Petrlik v. Community Realty Co., 347 F. Supp. 638, 645 (D. Md. 1972).
134. Richard v. Marriot Corp., 549 F.2d 303, 305 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 433
U.S. 915 (1977) where the employer's decision to refuse to pay and fight the
administrator's interpretation of coverage was taken to show a lack of good
faith, though the statute would appear to mean good faith at the time of
non-payment. Compare with Hodgson v. Square D Co., 459 F.2d 805 (6th
Cir. 1972) where the defense of good faith reliance was denied but liquidated damages were not awarded.
135. Lane v. M's Pub, Inc. 435 F. Supp. 917, 920 (D. Neb. 1977); Rau v. Darling Drug Store, Inc., 388 F. Supp. 877, 887 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (bonus paid to
employee showed good faith, though no explanation of how this shows reasonable grounds for violation).
136. Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 567 F.2d 429, 465 (D.C. Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1086 (1978) (employer must affirmatively show both
good faith and grounds for belief despite tradition of industry, collective
bargaining agreement, silence of employees and written opinion of counsel). See also Clark v. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 886, 893 (N.D.
Ga. 1973) (employee never reported overtime on time sheet; employer's
duty to see that he doesn't work or is paid when he does).
137. Addison v. Huron Stevedoring Corp., 204 F.2d 88, 93 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 346 U.S. 877 (1953).
138. Caserta v. Home Lines Agency, Inc., 273 F.2d 943, 948 (2d Cir. 1959).
139. § 10.
140. Usery v. Goodwin Hardware, Inc., 426 F. Supp. 1243, 1268 (W.D. Mich.
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a claim would contravene and nullify the statutory policy of the

FLSA.141 Only when the entire amount of unpaid wages are
paid under the Secretary of Labor's supervision will a court find
a valid waiver of any further claim.142
An otherwise valid collective bargaining agreement has
143
never been effective to avoid the provisions of the FLSA.
Courts have also ruled that an employee is under no duty to
submit his overtime claim to arbitration under a grievance procedure.'4 But, it has been held that under certain circumstances, good faith is a defense under the FLSA and the court
would therefore not reconsider a claim already submitted to arbitration.1 45
An "estoppel" argument often arises in cases where the
Act's required records 146 are unavailable or incorrect. 147 In Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co. 148 the Court held that the em-

ployee need only show that he worked some overtime for which
he was not properly compensated. Once on aggrieved employee
has made such a showing, he could be awarded an "approxi149
mate" amount of damages.
The employer cannot be heard to complain that the damages lack
1976) (Congress intended to exclude any defense based on an oral misrepresentation by statutory requirement of reliance on a written ruling).
141. Brennan v. Sinor, 391 F. Supp. 681, 684 (N.D. Okla. 1974). The court's
language suggests that it might validate a release "if" given under circumstances which would not contravene the statutory purpose, Id.
142. Sneed v. Sneed's Shipbldg., Inc., 545 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1977) where
after the employee had complained to the Wage and Hour Administration
the employer gave him a check for the entire amount the administrator
found due. Though the employee never cashed the check, the court
equated the payment with the provision of section 16(c) of the FLSA authorizing the administrator to supervise the payment of unpaid compensation. Id. at 539-40.
143. Martino v. Michigan Window Cleaning Co., 327 U.S. 173, 178 (1946).
144. U.S. Bulk Carriers v. Arguelles, 400 U.S. 351 (1971). See also Iowa
Beef Packers, Inc. v. Thompson, 405 U.S. 228 (1972) (per curiam dismissing
cert. as improvidently granted) (since the agreement only provided for arbitration of disputes under its terms, 185 N.W.2d 738 (Iowa 1971), their was
nothing to add to the Arguelles decision). Two years later, the Court passed
on a chance to add to its previous decision. See note 145 infra.
145. Satterwhite v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 496 F.2d 448, 452 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1071 (1974).
146. § 11(c). See text accompanying note 29 supra.
147. The employer's duty is not only to keep the records, but to see that
they are accurate. Brennan v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 482 F.2d
825 (5th Cir. 1973) (company responsible for supervisors' understatements
of overtime worked); Wirtz v. Williams, 369 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1966) (employer's system of reporting hours based on time he estimated that job
should take violated record keeping requirements).
148. 328 U.S. 680 (1946).
149. Id. at 686-87,followed in Hodgson v. American Concrete Constr. Co.,
Inc. 471 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 949 (1973); Wirtz v. Turner,
330 F.2d 11 (7th Cir. 1964); Mitchell v. Mitchell Truck Line, Inc., 286 F.2d 721
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the exactness and precision of measurement that would be possible had he kept records in accordance with the requirements of section 11(c) of the Act. And even where the lack of adequate records
grows out of a bona fide mistake as to whether certain activities or
non-activities constitute work, the employer having received the
benefits of such work, cannot object to the payment for the work on
the most accurate basis possible under the circumstances. Nor is
such a result to be condemned by the rule that precludes the recovonly to
ery of uncertain and speculative damages. That rule applies
1 50
situations where the fact of damage is itself uncertain.
Courts have required this shifting of the burden even to employers who had no reason to anticipate the need to keep the
151
records.
"Since the Fair Labor Standards Act was designed to implement a national policy, its purpose may not be frustrated by the
joint actions of an employer and his employees."' 15 2 There is no
estoppel defense even where the employee was responsible for
reporting his own hours. 153 The "[o] bligation is the employer's
and it is absolute,"'154 even where the employee was under contract not to work over forty hours weekly.'5 5 Nor does the employee have a duty to report his hours promptly so as to mitigate
156
damages for his employer.
In one case a court found an estoppel due to the "iniquitous
misconduct" of the employee who "cannot be heard to say...
that he deliberately and voluntarily falsified reports.' 1 57 However, the Court of Appeals, in affirming, based its decision solely
on the insufficiency of the evidence. 5 8 The better view remains
(5th Cir. 1961), Marshall v. R & M Erectors, Inc., 429 F. Supp. 771 (D. Del.
1977).
150. 328 U.S. at 688.
151. Bingham v. Airport Limousine Serv., 314 F. Supp. 565, 572 (W.D. Ark.
1970) (change in exemption for tipped employees).
152. Smith v. Superior Casing Crews, 299 F. Supp. 725, 730-31 (E.D. La.
1969). See also Handler v. Thrasher, 191 F.2d 120, 123 (10th Cir. 1951) (contract to circumvent the FLSA void and unenforceable); Schultz v. Bob Johnson Meat Co., 306 F. Supp. 720, 722 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (rights cannot be
bargained away even though the parties acted in good faith).
153. Burry v. National Trailer Convoy, Inc. 338 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1964);
Clark v. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
154. Caserta v. Home Lines Agency, Inc., 273 F.2d 943, 946 (2d Cir. 1959).
155. Burry v. National Trailer Convoy, Inc., 338 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1964)
(employer should have known that employee was working overtime).
156. De Pasquale v. Williams-Bauer Corp., 151 F.2d 578, 580 (2d Cir. 1945).
The court also disallowed defenses of release, accord and satisfaction, and
account stated. Id. at 579-80.
157. Wirtz v. Harrigill, 214 F. Supp. 813, 815 (D. Miss. 1963).
158. 328 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1964). The court found that, unlike Mt. Clemens, there was not sufficient evidence to show that the employee had
worked any overtime at all. But cf. Mitchell v. All-States Business Prod.
Corp., 250 F. Supp. 403, 408 (E.D.N.Y. 1965) (if employee's own records are
not credible, use other evidence).
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that an employer's "argument of estoppel ignores that this case
lies in an area where agreements and other acts that would normally have controlling legal significance are overcome by con' 159
gressional policy.
EXPANDING SCOPE OF OVERTIME LIABILITY
The overtime provision of the original FLSA applied to employees engaged "in the production of goods for commerce. u60
Courts concluded that by this language Congress did not intend
to use the full extent of its commerce power. 16 1 The Act has
since been amended to include "enterprise coverage"' 162 as well
as specific inclusions of other employees, 163 and accordingly
164
courts now interpret Congressional intention expansively.
While a plaintiff employee must plead and prove that he is
covered by the Act, 65 the burden is on the employer to show
that he is entitled to a particular exemption, 66 and such exemp159. Caserta v. Home Lines Agency, Inc., 273 F.2d 943, 946 (2d Cir. 1959).
160. § 7(a)(1).
161. "[TIhe scope of the Act is not coextensive with the limits of the
power of Congress over Commerce," A.B. Kirschbaum, Co. v. Walling, 316
U.S. 517, 523 (1942).
162. "Enterprise" is defined in the FLSA as:
the related activities performed (either through unified operation or
common control) by any person or persons for a common business purpose, and includes all such activities whether performed in one or more
establishments or by one more corporate or other organizational
units....
29 U.S.C. § 203(r) (1977). After the 1966 Amendments, Section 7(a) (1) of the
FLSA reads:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, no employer shall employ
any of his employees who in any workweek is engaged in commerce or
in the production of goods for commerce, or is employed in an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce,
for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives
compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at
which he is employed.
29 U.S.C. § 207(a) (1).
'Enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce' means an enterprise which has employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce. ...
Id. at § 203(s).
163. The 1966 Amendments added to the definition of a covered enterprise any school, hospital, or mental or old-age institution (whether public
or private). Id. at § 203(s) (4).
164. See note 118 supra.
165. Warren-Bradshaw Drilling Co. v.Hall, 317 U.S. 88, 90 (1942). The
proof requires establishing the employee-employer relationship and the
coverage of the employer.
166. Mitchell v.Kentucky Fin. Co., Inc., 359 U.S.290, 291 (1959). See also
Sinclair v.Beacon Gasoline Co., 447 F.Supp.519 (W.D.La.1978) ("Because
of the importance of the overtime provisions infostering the smooth flow of
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tions are to be narrowly construed against the party claiming
them. 167 Some courts have made the employer's burden nearly
insurmountable.
Which Employees are Covered?
Certain higher paid employees are putatively excepted from
coverage as those "employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity. '168 Regulations which severely
limit this exemption have been upheld by the courts. 169 One requirement for exemption as a "professional" is that the employee's work involve predominately the exercise of
"independent judgment" rather than the exercise of acquired
skills.' 70 Applying this subtle distinction to ever-growing enterprises where few employees can really exercise "independent
judgment" leads to unexpected results.
In a recent case,1 71 ten computer programmers sued their
former employer for unpaid overtime. The case turned on
whether they were exempt administrative employees. The applicable regulation was equivocal 172 and an expert witness testified to the need for exercising independent judgment in their
work. 7 3 The trial judge rejected the expert testimony finding
interstate commerce, the employer seeking the exemption bears the burden
of proving his entitlement to it.")
167. Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U.S. 388, 392 (1960): "[alnd their
application limited to those establishments plainly and unmistakeably
within their terms and spirit." Id. See also Hamblen v. Ware, 526 F.2d 476,

477 (6th Cir. 1975).
168. FLSA, § 13(a)(1).
169. Brennan v. South Davis Community Hosp., 538 F.2d 859, 865 (10th

Cir. 1976) (x-ray technicians: "employer has the burden of establishing the
exemption affirmatively and clearly"). Usery v. Associated Drugs, Inc., 538
F.2d 1191, 1194 (5th Cir. 1976) (pharmacists: "employer has the burden of

proving the existence of each of the conditions or standards prescribed by
the Regulations"). The regulation defining a bona fide professional, 29

C.F.R. § 541.3 (1977), is followed by others detailing requirements of education, salary, time spent in non-exempt work, primary duty, discretion and
judgment. § 541.314 makes an exception for physicians, lawyers, and teachers, who are always exempted if they are licensed and actively performing

their profession.
170. 29 C.F.R. § 541.305 (1977).
171. Pezzillo v. General Tel. & Elec. Information Sys., Inc., 414 F. Supp.
1257 (M.D. Tenn. 1976), affirmed per curiam, 572 F.2d 1189 (6th Cir. 1978).
172. The regulation on the data processing field first lists tasks which require discretion and independent judgment which are done by programmers; then says that the exemption depends on the facts of the particular
case; and then lists other tasks not requiring independent judgment performed by other data processing employees who are not exempt. 29 C.F.R.
§ 541.207(c) (7) (1977).
173. The court found that the defendant-employer had not carried its
burden of proving that no more than 20% of the employee's time was spent
doing non-exempt work. 414 F. Supp. at 1269.
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that the employer could not in good faith have failed to realize
that the job involved primarily the use of skill. He awarded back
pay and the full amount of liquidated damages. 174 The Court of
Appeals refused to reverse or modify, finding the decision solely
within the trial court's discretion. 75 The victorious plaintiffs
had been hired as temporary employees. Their judgment came
after any reasonable expectation of further compensation for
the work involved had ended.
In another case, 176 the court upheld the Secretary's interpretation of the executive exemption as only applying to that
177
work actually done in a bona fide administrative capacity.
The result was that managers who admittedly were usually exempt from the Act were held covered by the overtime provisions
1 78
for time they spent doing "strike duty."'
In an early FLSA case denying to an employer an estoppel
defense, the court stressed that the "plaintiffs were extremely
ignorant men."'179 Less clear is whether employees who are arguably professionals should also be beneficiaries of the policy
imposing a form of strict liability on their employers.
What Hours Worked are Covered?
Great liability may result when an employer's plan for fixed
pay covering varying work weeks is held invalid. 180 Since 1949,
the FLSA has contained a specific exemption' 8' which has been
held to be the sole such plan permitted by the Act. 182 The Secre174. Since the employer was aware of the FLSA, the court found that the
violation was willful and the three year statute of limitation would apply.
See notes 113-18 and accompanying text supra. Since the employer was
aware that there was no blanket exemption for computer programmers, it
could not rely in good faith on being exempt in the particular case. The
court therefore awarded liquidated damages though "most reluctant to
grant plaintiffs a 'windfall' when they were paid as highly skilled artisans."
414 F. Supp. at 1270.
175. 572 F.2d at 1190.
176. Brennan v. Western Union Tel. Co., 561 F.2d 477 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1063 (1977).

177. An employee can be exempt in one week and covered by the FLSA
in the next week if in the second week over 20% of his working time is spent
in non-exempt work. 29 C.F.R. § 541.1(e) (1977).
178. 561 F.2d at 483-84. This suit had been brought by the Secretary of

Labor. See note 36 supra.
179. De Pasquale v. Williams-Bauer Corp., 151 F.2d 578, 579 (2d Cir. 1945)
(therefore "lack of records does not preclude them from obtaining protection"). Id.
180. See notes 51-54 and accompanying text supra.
181. § 7(f) allows an employer pursuant to an express agreement, to pay
a fixed weekly guarantee which stipulates a regular and overtime rate.
182. 29 C.F.R. § 778.403 (1977): "Section 7(f) is the only provision of the

Act which allows an employer to pay the same total compensation each
week to an employee who works overtime and whose hours vary from week
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tary has interpreted the exemption to be inapplicable to a case
where the employee is given compensatory time off in a later
pay period-even at the rate of one-and-a-half hours off for each
hour of overtime worked. 183 Courts have upheld this ruling and
found employers liable for unpaid overtime compensation even
where the employees had already taken their "comp" time, however, the exact amount of damages in such circumstances is uncertain.
In Thomas v. State of Louisiana,184 the court held for the
employees and ordered briefing and argument on the question
of damages. 185 However, a settlement was reached and allowed
because of an intervening court decision' 86 and pending amendments to the FLSA.' 8 7 The settlement was for the full amount of
back pay for the hours worked (for which some of the employees had already taken off their compensatory time). Presumably, the only amount in dispute at that point was liquidated
damages.
In affirming a similar holding against a public employer, 188
the Court of Appeals found that "the main objective of the
FLSA's overtime compensation provision: the broadening of employment... could be easily defeated if the employer were allowed discretion to manipulate the scheduled time off so as to
to week." These plans are called "Belo" plans after the case validating
them. See notes 51-54 and accompanying text supra. To qualify, the agreement must be express, and must contemplate an overtime premium. Brennan v. Valley Towing Co., 515 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1975); Triple "AAA" Co. v.
Wirtz, 378 F.2d 884 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 959 (1968).
183. Wage and Hour Administrator Opinion Letter No. 913 (December 27,
1968).
184. Thomas v. State of Louisiana, 348 F. Supp. 792, (W.D. La. 1972). A
subsequent order setting aside a settlement agreement was reversed, 534
F:2d 613 (5th Cir. 1976).
185. 348 F. Supp. at 796-97.
186. Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of
Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973) which held that in extending
FLSA coverage to state governments, Congress did not intend to abridge
Eleventh Amendment immunity and allow private individuals to bring
16(b) actions against a state in federal court. This decision came before
final judgment in the lower court whereupon Thomas and Louisiana settled
the claim for the back pay only.
187. In section 6 of the 1974 Amendments, Congress showed that it did
indeed mean to allow private suits against states and suspended the statute
of limitations so that suits dismissed because of the Court's decision could
be revived. Thomas thereupon petitioned to have the settlement set aside.
In reversing and upholding the settlement, the Fifth Circuit held that
the agreement was akin to a stipulated judgment which had never been included in the prohibition against settlement of section 16(b) suits. 534 F.2d
at 614-15, referring to, D.A. Schulte v. Gangi, 328 U.S. at 113 n.8.
188. Brennan v. State of New Jersey, 364 F. Supp. 156 (D.N.J. 1973), affirmed in part,vacated in part, 522 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated sub nom.
New Jersey v. Usery, 427 U.S. 909 (1976).
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coincide with off-season or slack work periods ...

-"189 In view

of the fact that some employees had already been given compensatory time off, the court remanded for reconsideration of

damages in light of policies enunciated in certain cases. 190
Since the cited cases hold that liquidated damages are
mandatory, the employer was apparently faced with triple liability. 19 1 However, the case was vacated when the Supreme Court

ruled that the FLSA overtime provisions could not be constitu92
tionally applied to certain activities of state government.
193
A private employer in such a case will not be so fortunate.
Further, he stands little chance of recovering for the time taken
off by the employees. Set-offs are strongly disfavored in FLSA
95
cases19 4 and a counterclaim may be procedurally impossible.
Who May Bring Suit and Recover?
The statutory purposes of the FLSA are to abate substandard labor conditions, prevent unfair competitive practices, and
to spread employment. 96 From these purposes certain classes
of persons within the statute's protection may be identified:
those who worked under the proscribed conditions; those who
compete with violators of the Act; and those who are unemployed. Only the first class is expressly given a private right of
197
action.
An employee who agreed to work overtime hours without
189. 522 F.2d at 510.
190. Id. at 517 n.23. The cases cited were the district court's Thomas

opinion, Aaron, Schulte, and three appeals court opinions from the 1940s.

191. Of course, if the time off was taken at the employer's convenience
(both cases' plans provided for the "comp" time to be taken at the mutual

convenience of employer and employee) then the employer is incurring no
damage.
192. See note 99 supra.
193. See Clark v. Atlanta Newspapers, Inc., 366 F. Supp. 886 (N.D. Ga.
1973).

194. The only economic feud contemplated by the FLSA involves the

employer's obedience to minimum wage and overtime standards. To

clutter these proceedings with the minutiae of other employer-employee relationships would be antithetical to the purpose of the Act.
Set-offs against back pay awards deprive the employee of the 'cash in
hand' contemplated by the Act, and are therefore inappropriate in any
proceeding brought to enforce the FLSA ....
Brennan v. Heard, 491 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1974).

195. If the suit is brought by the Secretary under sections 16(c) or 17,
then a counterclaim will be disallowed as one against the United States.
Mitchell v. Riley, 164 F. Supp. 419 (W.D.S.C. 1958), Mitchell v. Floyd Pappin
&Son, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 755 (D. Mont. 1954). In a 16(b) suit there may be no
jurisdiction for a counterclaim. Timberlake v. Day &Zimmerman, Inc., 49 F.
Supp. 28 (N.D. Iowa 1943).
196. See text accompanying notes 6 & 46 supra.
197. § 16(b). See text accompanying note 40 supra.
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the required compensation may have been fearful of losing his
job.19 8 But an employee who actually wishes to work the overtime is in pari delicto with his employer in injuring the other
classes of protected persons. Yet Congress has chosen to allow-indeed encourage-such employees to bring strike suits
against their employers, and has given an explicit private right
to recover for any employer retaliation. 199
Though an employee bringing a section 16(b) action is theoretically representing the public interest in reducing unemployment, the Act gives him the right to represent other similarly
situated employees 20 0-not the unemployed. Unlike the usual
class action, the right is not discretionary with the court, though
the FLSA requires the written consent of employees who choose
to "opt-in."'20 1 The importance of the class action has been increased by a decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
affirming a lower court decision ordering notice to be sent to
other potential plaintiffs. 202 Another district court has ordered
a defendant employer to post such a notice on its bulletin board
with blank consent forms which could be returned to the plain20 3
tiff's counsel.
Counsel for a plaintiff-employee who prevails is entitled to
an award of attorney's fees.2°4 Even where a court denies liquidated damages upon a showing of good faith, the award of attorneys' fees and costs is mandatory. 20 5 Counsel may be allowed
additional compensation when an action is appealed.2 06 In one
case, an attorney received both a contingent fee from his clients'
198. See, e.g., Burr v. National Trailer Convoy, Inc., 338 F.2d 422, 425 (6th
Cir. 1964) (employer suggested that job might be eliminated if it required

paying for over 40 hours a week).
199. Section 10 of the 1977 Amendments which gives employees a private
cause of action for unlawful retaliation. See notes 41-43 and accompanying
text supra.
200. Section 16(b) expressly allows an employee to sue in behalf of
others similarly situated. The Portal-to-Portal Act, § 5(a) requires that such
other employees must consent in writing to becoming parties.
201. Id.
202. Braunstein v. Eastern Photographic Laboratories, Inc., No. 78-7464
(2d Cir. Nov. 17, 1978). Contra Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Vorhes, 564 F.2d 859

(9th Cir. 1977).
203. Lantz v. B-1202 Corp., 429 F. Supp. 421, 424 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
204. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
205. Wright v. Carrig, 275 F.2d 448 (4th Cir. 1960). But cf.Hayes v. Bill
Hayley &His Comets, Inc., 274 F. Supp. 34, 37 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (no attorney's
fees will be awarded when not requested in complaint). See also Brennan
v. Heard, 491 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1974) (error for trial court to refuse witness'
fees to employee-witnesses).
206. Montalvo v. Tower Life Bldg., 426 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1970); Bable v.
T.W. Phillips Gas &Oil Co., 287 F.2d 21 (3d Cir. 1961). But cf.U.S. Steel Co.
v. Burkett, 192 F.2d 489 (4th Cir. 1951) (original fee should be adequate to
cover appeal).
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20 7
recovery and a court awarded fee from the defendant.
The mandatory fees, the ease of bringing a class action, and
the substantive law placing much of the burden of proof on a
defending employer, will encourage attorneys to seek out and
bring more actions under section 16(b). Higher-paid employees
are more likely to learn of their right to bring such suits and are
more likely to have worked overtime without being paid the required compensation.2 0 8 Higher salaries mean higher potential
recoveries for unpaid overtime. These factors, coupled with a
continuing Congressional and judicial policy of encouraging employees to bring private actions, indicate that employers are
now facing significant unexpected liability from the maximum
hours provision of the FLSA.

CONCLUSION

The payment of time-and-a-half for overtime was intended
to be an exception for the benefit of employers who wished to
work their employees for more than the maximum hours imposed by the FLSA.20 9 The policy of the Act would prefer that
no overtime at all be worked. An employer who elects to have
his employees work more than the statutory maximum hours
has no cause to complain "because Congress chose to use a210less
drastic prohibition than outright prohibition of overtime."
The effects of the FLSA on "spreading employment" are
questionable. 21 ' In 1966, Congress ordered a study of such effects. 212. The results of the study were inconclusive, yet this has
207. Ivey v. Foremost Dairies, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 793 (W.D. La. 1952). But
see Harrington v. Empire Constr. Co., 167 F.2d 389 (4th Cir. 1948) (attorney
must give up fee received from employees because Congress intended them
to have the full amount of back pay); Sykes v. Lochmann, 156 Kan. 223, 132
P.2d 620, cert. denied, 319 U.S. 753 (1943) (contingent fee contract void and

unenforceable).
208. Over 60% of those workers working over 40 hours weekly come from
the less than 40% of the work force made up of managers, professionals, and
craftsmen. LEVITAN, MANGUM, & MARSHALL, HUMAN RESOURCES AND LABOR

MARKETS, p. 20 (1976).
209. The language of section 7 at first prohibits all overtime work and
then allows an exception for the employer willing to pay the time-and-one-

half. See note 162 supra.
210. Missel v. Overnight Motor Transp. Co., 316 U.S. at 578.
211. Some professional economists have claimed that Fair Labor Standards legislation has the effect of reducing employment. See M. FRIEDMAN,
CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM, 180-81 (1962); Mincer, Unemployment Effects of
Minimum Wages, 84 J. POL. ECON. 2 (1976).
212. U.S. DE PT. OF LABOR, PREMIUM PAYMENTS FOR OVERTIME UNDER THE

FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (1967). The report found that hiring and training costs and the increasing cost of fringe benefits (not completely subject
to the time and one-half requirement) decreases the deterrant effect of the
overtime provisions and the likelihood of employers hiring more workers.
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not deterred Congress from further expanding the Act's coverage 213 and encouraging private actions in accordance with its
provisions.
An employer should now carefully balance the costs to his
business of either scruptuously paying the required "time-anda-half" compensation, or prohibiting his employees from working any overtime at all. He cannot realistically rely on any exemptions from coverage or the hope that his employees will
never bring suit against him. Whatever anomalies may be found
in the scheme of private enforcement chosen by Congress, a private employer who elects an "all or nothing gamble" 2 14 with the
2 15
FLSA, cannot realistically expect any luck with the courts.
Whether a plaintiff employee is truly suffering from substandard labor conditions or is seeking a windfall from liquidated damages, his right to bring an action against his employer
is clearly established:
To enforce one's rights when they are violated is never a legal
wrong, and may often be a moral duty. It happens in many instances that the violation passes with no effort to redress it-sometimes from praiseworthy forbearance, sometimes from weakness,
sometimes from mere inertia. But the law, which creates a right,
can certainly not concede
2 16 that an insistence upon its enforcement
is evidence of a wrong.
MarshallK. Brown

However, some employers recognize that worker efficiency decreases as
hours worked increases beyond forty. Id. at 20-22.
213. 1974 and 1977 Amendments. See H. REP. No. 95-521, p. 32, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in, [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM. NEws 3201,
3233:
E ]xemptions from the minimum wage and/or overtime standards set
forth in this legislation should be continued only if there was a proven
need for such exemptions. It is the view of this committee that there
are a number of overtime exemptions for which no need exists today
even if there was justification in the past for enacting them.
214. D.A. Schulte v. Gangi, 328 U.S. at 116.
215. [T] he proposition that regulation of the minimum price of a commodity--even labor-will increase the quantity consumed is not one
that I can readily understand. That concern, however, .. merely re-

flects my views on a policy issue which has been firmly resolved by the
branches of government having power to decide such questions. ...
My disagreement with the wisdom of this legislation may not, of
course, affect my judgment with respect to its validity. On this issue
there is no dissent from the proposition that the Federal Government's
power over the labor market is adequate to embrace these employees.
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 881 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
216. Morningstar v. Lafayette Hotel Co., 105 N.E. 656, 657, 211 N.Y. 596
(1914) (Cardozo, J.).

